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$EVWUDFW We analyze results from two categories of experiments where the subjects received
controlled signals about the sex of their co-players. In a series of Battle of the Sexes
experiments the subjects played more hawkish against women than against men. The impact
of the sex signal was most pronounced among female subjects. In the second category of
experiments we develop a measure of discrimination effects. We then survey discrimination
effects across 32 subject groups from Israel, Sweden, UK and USA. The results indicate
discrimination against females in experimental bargaining. This discrimination behavior is
significant among females but not among males.
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The aim of this paper is to study how controlled signals about a bargaining party’s sex affect
experimental behavior. It has been established in various field studies that discrimination
occurs in certain economic transactions.
1 However, until recently there have been virtually no
studies on discrimination effects in experimental economics.
2 This is somewhat surprising
since the possibility of controlling variables in experiments ought to be particularly valuable
in studies of discrimination behavior, where situation specific variables can be important.
In order to study discrimination behavior, subjects have to be able to base their
discriminatory action on some controlled signal that reveal information about their bargaining
parties. In this paper we will study how information about the opponent’s sex affects the
subjects’ behavior in two classes of bargaining situations. The first class refer to Battle of the
Sexes (henceforth, BS) situations where each bargaining party cannot act favorably or
unfavorably against their bargaining opponents without knowing or guessing their opponents’
choices. In Holm (1998) it was shown that signals about the bargaining opponents gender
affected the subjects choices and improved the coordination behavior in some BS
experiments. The most striking effect was that both males and females played more
“hawkish” when they knew that their opponent was female compared to when it was a male.
However, although the subjects discriminated between different gender signals in a technical
sense, it can be argued that (due to the coordination aspect) this is not discrimination in the
meaning that females are necessarily treated unfavorably. The second class of bargaining
situations has the property that one party can unambiguously act favorably or unfavorably
against their opponent without knowing the opponent’s action. This is, for instance, the case
                                                          
1 See the audit studies of Neumark (1996) and Ayres and Siegelmann (1995).
2 Recent exceptions to this are Fershtman and Gneezy (1998), Holm (1997, 1998) and Solnick (1998). The first
paper establishes the presence of experimental ethnic discrimination in a trust game in Israel. The second and
third papers analyze and demonstrate significant gender based coordination attempts in a series of “BS”
experiments conducted both in Sweden and in USA. The last paper studies the effects of the co-players' gender
in a Ultimatum game.5
for both the proposer and the responder in ultimatum games. In this class of situations we
demonstrate that it is less problematic to define and measure experimental discrimination
effects.
In this paper we shall focus on gender differences. Do males and females
respond similarly to controlled signals about their co-players’ sex in bargaining situations?
We will try to answer this question by studying all reported bargaining experiments that
belong to either of the two classes of bargaining situations mentioned above and that apply
adequate treatments of the subjects. Adequate treatment means in particular that the subjects’
are given a controlled signal that reveals the co-player’s sex and that the experiment involves
monetary incentives.
In the first class of bargaining situations we analyze the results of Holm’s (1998,
2000) studies of BS games that were run in USA and in Sweden. The experimental data from
this series of experiment suggest that women on average are more sensitive to the gender of
their co-player than men. If we accept that the magnitude of sex discrimination in a
population can be measured as the subjects’ average sensitivity to the gender signal, then this
means that the women are more inclined to sex discrimination than the men. However, we
detect cultural differences. Whereas the Swedish female and male sensitivity to the gender
signal is about the same, the American females were much more sensitive to the gender signal
compared to the males. Among the American subjects, almost all gender signal sensitivity can
be attributed to the female group’s tendency to behave more hawkish against females than
against males.
To investigate this issue further a measure is developed to study discrimination
effects for the second class of bargaining situations. The discrimination effect measure is
positive when a subject group treats female co-players unfavorable (compared to males) and it
is negative when females are treated favorable. From the experimental literature we found 166
male and 16 female subject groups that received treatments that were adequate and satisfied
the conditions to be included in the present study.
3 The discrimination effect was positive in
25 out of 32 observations, which indicate discrimination against females in these experiments.
Furthermore, discrimination against females was more common among the female subject
groups than among the male subject groups; 15 out of 16 female subject groups had a positive
discrimination effect whereas the same relation among the male groups was 10 out of 16.
In this paper we will also try to discuss economic theoretical explanations for
the main part of the observed behavior and relate our results to the meta-analytical studies on
gender differences in psychology (see e.g., Eagly, 1995). According to the psychological
research, peoples’ stereotypes about gender are in general supported by empirical facts. This
means that there may be an economic rationale for people to hold them and use them. For
instance, in the BS we claim that there is a natural correspondence between gender
stereotypes and the strategy choices that the parties utilize in trying to coordinate. In order to
explain that females are more sensitive to gender signals than males we argue that economic
institutions (e.g., discrimination policies, anti-discrimination laws) are designed to help and
protect the discriminated party which means that the expected value of being observant to
gender will be higher for females.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss different methods of
studying discrimination. Applying economic experiments to issues regarding discrimination is
an unexplored field. In order to motivate this endeavor we try to assess the pros and cons of
the experimental method in relation to other methods used. We then describe a series of BS
experiments in section 3. In section 4 a measure to evaluate discrimination effects are
presented and the discrimination effects for a class of experimental bargaining situations are
                                                          
3 These subject groups were from Israel, Sweden, UK and USA and the discrimination effects were obtained
from the following studies: Fershtman and Gneezy (1998), Solnick (1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999),
Scharleman et al.(1999), and Holm, (2000).7
studied. In section 5 we try to give an economic explanation to our observations. Finally, in
section 6 we discuss some implications of our results.
'LVFULPLQDWLRQ(IIHFWVDQGWKH([SHULPHQWDO0HWKRG
As pointed out before, economic experimental discrimination behavior is an unexplored field.
This motivates a section discussing the experimental method compared to the more
commonly used methods.
Usually we mean that discrimination takes place when somebody because of sex
or ethnicity is treated differently and often with negative consequences for the discriminated
party. For a number of reasons it is difficult to isolate discrimination effects in field studies.
4
Besides, the more subtle problems to be mentioned below, one obvious reason is that people
are reluctant to admit discriminatory actions and some may be unconscious about their own
discrimination behavior if directly asked.
Evidence on discrimination is either derived indirectly by studying gender
differences (such as wage gaps) from existing statistical data by regression analyses or more
directly from observations in audit studies. There are several well-known problems with both
methods and I shall mention some of the most important ones. In studies of the former type
there is a potential omitted variable bias which means that if discrimination is defined as the
residual, then if some important explanatory variable is left out the discrimination effect may
be larger or smaller than it really is. Thus, the gender differences may be generated by other
factors than discrimination.
5 Secondly, it may also be the case that the regression includes
                                                          
4 For a discussion see e.g., Gunderson (1989), Goldin (1990) and Heckman (1998).
5 For studies see e.g., O’Neill and Polachek (1993), Polachek (1981) and Andrisani (1984).8
variables that are treated as controls, which are affected by discrimination.
6 For instance, if
females have expectations about future labor market discrimination, this may affect their
human capital acquisition and hence the gender wage gap. Treating human capital as a control
would then hide part of the discrimination effect.
A prerequisite for direct discrimination to take place, the discriminatory actions
have to be based on a signal about category (like sex or ethnicity).
7 The audit method relies on
forming audit pairs that ideally are similar in all respects deemed as important (e.g.,
education, attractiveness, experience) except that they differ by category. Heckman (1998)
has pointed out a complex of problems with this method. For instance, although the audit
pairs are matched to control for the most obvious factors, there are a number of unobserved
variables that may systematically affect those making choices (e.g., employers) in a way that
appears to be discriminatory when it is not (or the results may not indicate discrimination
when discrimination actually takes place). There are also conflicting views about how much
information the auditors should be given. For instance, if the auditors are informed that the
study concerns discrimination this may affect how the auditors behave and what information
they observe which may bias the study.
8
We argue that the experimental method can enrich discrimination research not
because it lacks flaws, but because it mitigates some problems associated with field studies
and thereby makes a useful complement.
There are a number of reasons why the possibility of better controlling variables
in experiments allow for studies in which direct discrimination effects can more narrowly be
                                                          
6 See for instance Goldberg (1996).
7 Once the signal is known there are various theories to explain discrimination. This literature ranges from
theories about preferences for certain groups (Becker, 1957), differences in labor supply elasticities (Madden,
1973), signaling theories (Milgrom and Oster, 1987), employer prejudices (Bergmann, 1971), differences in
working life (Goldin, 1986) to theories about male and females interaction within a household (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1996; and Francois, 1998).
8 However, Yinger (1998) notes that under some circumstances when for instance the auditors are exposed to
discriminatory behavior, having told the auditors the purpose of the study may help them to preserve the
accuracy of their observations.9
studied and isolated.
9 First, although experiments also involve unobservable variables,
experimental research has generated a catalogue of variables affecting experimental behavior
and their expected effects are in many cases well documented. This means that the
interpretation of the results is likely to be less uncertain and if uncertainty remains new and
more targeted experiments can usually be conducted. Second, the study of discrimination in
experiments can focus on more general aspects of discrimination behavior that are blurred by
the situation specific aspects of audit studies. If we take Heckman’s (1998) remarks seriously,
then in order to conduct and interpret an audit study like the one by Ayres and Siegelman
(1995) that is based on experienced car dealers’ behavior, it is not sufficient to know the audit
methodology and economic theory. It is also necessary to have substantial knowledge about
the Chicago car dealers’ market. Third, like audit studies but unlike statistical regression
analyses the experimental method allows for more close studies of the mechanisms involved
in discrimination since the data reveals individual decisions. This means that more complex
forms of discrimination can be detected and analyzed, which we hope our experimental
results below will demonstrate. Finally, it has been convincingly argued by e.g., Kagel and
Roth (1995) that the process of designing and observing experiments often stimulates the
generation and modification of theory. The experimental study of discrimination behavior
should be no exception.
To balance our presentation let us mention some problems associated with the
experimental method. First, experiments concern more or less artificial situations, which
means that the observed experimental behavior may deviate from natural behavior. Secondly,
often there are a set of practical limitations to experiments (e.g., in terms of monetary
                                                          
9 The experimental method also has a research ethical advantage to audit studies in that those subjects involved
in the study are volunteers. Although, the subjects may not know the ”whole truth” about the experiment before
they participate, they will at least know they participate in experimental situation and they can be informed about
the ”whole truth” quickly afterwards.10
resources and access to relevant subject groups) that may generate a somewhat fragmented
body of knowledge.
7KH%DWWOHRIWKH6H[HV
In this section we shall first present and analyze the observations from two similar BS
(henceforth BS) experiments conducted in Sweden and in USA. After that we shall present
the results from two additional BS studies in Sweden make some conclusions regarding the
observations for this type of games.
$QH[SHULPHQWFRQGXFWHGLQ6ZHGHQDQGLQ86$
In the Swedish experiment 145 undergraduate students were recruited from the introductory
course in economics at the School of Economics and Management at Lund University. The
American subject group consisted of 164 undergraduates from Northwestern University from
the same category of students as in the Swedish study (i.e., undergraduates following the
introductory course in Economics). The general design of the experiments, the information to
the subjects, the questionnaire and the experimental sessions were the same in almost every
detail and is presented in the Appendix.
10
Each subject faced the problem of sharing $100 with an anonymous male or
female student co-player.
11 Hence, the only pieces of information the subjects got about their
co-players were their sex and that they were students. In order to get some money the subject
and his co-player had to choose without communicating so that the sum of their shares
                                                          
10 Additional details about the experiment are available in Holm (1998) and can be obtained from the author.11
equaled $100. If the sum was more or less both players received zero. The subjects could
choose between two ways of sharing: the "hawkish" strategy that gives $60 to the subject (and
$40 to the co-player), and the "dovish" strategy that gives $40 to the subject (and $60 to the
co-player). Clearly, the hawkish strategy is the optimal one if the subject believes that the
probability that the co-player plays the dovish strategy is sufficiently high and the dovish
strategy is optimal otherwise. To avoid unnatural behavior and demand effects the
experiments were designed as not to reveal that the experiment concerned discrimination
effects.
We deliberately choose the BS game since we expected it to be sensitive to
gender signals. By combining coordination motives with conflict of interest the BS game
motivates the subject to search for possible clues to coordinate on. This also means that one
should be careful when generalizing from observations in the BS game.
%DVLF5HVXOWV
The subjects’ choices are displayed in Table 1. There are four subgroups: female subjects
playing with female co-players - FF; females playing with males - FM; males playing with
males - MM; and males playing with females - MF.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The experiment also contained three other questions that are presented in Appendix 1. Note also, that in the
Swedish study the subjects shared SEK 500.12





Table 1: The proportion (in percent) of the subgroups that choose the hawkish strategy. (Source: Holm, 1998).
As we can see in Table 1 groups with female co-player’s (i.e., groups ending
with an F) have a significantly higher play of the hawkish strategy. Holm (1998) demonstrates
i) that a gender label effect exists and ii) that the effect can be analyzed as a focal point in the
Swedish population.
12 In the Swedish population males and females effectively coordinate
their behavior through the gender signal in a relatively symmetric way so that a high average
male hawkishness against females is matched by a high female dovishness against males. The
American experimental behavior also exhibit sensitivity to the gender signal, but of a different
character. Contrary, to the two-sided effect in the Swedish subject group the US
discrimination pattern is mainly one sided. This has consequences for the expected payoff in
the game. Let  SLM, be the proportion of gender  {} L0 ) Î ,  that chooses the hawkish strategy
when they know that their opponent belongs to gender  {} M0 ) Î , . For instance, in the
Swedish group we can read in Table 1 that  667 . 0 = )) S  and that  683 . 0 = 0) S . Based on the
frequencies in Table 1 the average expected payoff for a subject of gender L when meeting a
subject of gender M is calculated by  ( ) ( ) 40 1 60 1 ML LM ML LM LM S S S S - + - = p  and given in Table 2.
13
                                                          
12 These results are in line with Schelling’s (1960) general reasoning about the importance of contextual "non-
economic" salient information and Roth’s and Murnighan’s (1982) observation that "non-relevant" information
affects experimental bargaining behavior.
13 To make the Americans’ and Swedes’ expected payoffs comparable we have calculated the Swedish subjects’
expected payoff ”as if” they shared $100 instead of SEK500.13





Table 2: The expected average payoff for the various subgroups.
The symmetrical “discrimination” behavior in the Swedish groups with mixed
sexes (i.e., FM and MF) enhances coordination, which results in higher payoffs compared to
the corresponding American groups. The relative low payoff in the American mixed groups
can either be regarded as a coordination failure or as the cost of paranoid thinking. As a
coordination failure the American MF group can be “blamed” for not understanding that the
gender signal can be exploited given the behavior of the American FM group. The relative
low payoff for the American FM group can also be described as a cost of paranoia in that the
FM group plays "as if" the gender signal mattered to the males, which it did not.
7KH,PSDFWRIWKH*HQGHU6LJQDO
One indication of the impact of the gender signal is simply the absolute increase in frequency
of a behavior conditioned on the signal: For instance, 68.3 percent of the Swedish males play
hawkish against females, but only 51.9 percent of them play hawkish against a male co-14
player. The absolute change in units of percentages is given by  4 . 16 9 . 51 3 . 68 = - . Table 3
contains the figures of the absolute strength of the gender signal in the male and female
groups.
Swedish experiment American experiment
Female subjects: 31.4 26.9
Males subjects: 16.4  2.3
Table 3: Absolute differences (in units of percentages) in the play against females and males.
*HQGHU'LIIHUHQFHV
The question of gender effects in experiments concerning economic decision-making is open
from a general point of view. The effects depend on what behavior the experiment considers
and the details of the experimental design.
14 Fershtman and Gneezy (1998) report ethnic
discrimination among Israeli male students, but not among female students. Our results also
indicate gender differences, but of a different kind. The sensitivity to gender signals among
females is clearly higher for both the Swedish and the American subject groups compared to
the corresponding male gender sensitivity (see Table 3). If we test for homogeneity in the
whole group of American and Swedish female subjects we can reject the null hypothesis (of
homogeneity) at  0007 . 0 = S . If we make the same test for the males we cannot reject the null
hypothesis (since  22 . 0 = S ). Thus, whereas the co-player’s gender is highly significant in the
female group it is not significant in the male group. This relative difference is especially large
                                                          
14 For experimental studies on gender differences see: Bolton and Katok (1993) and Eckel and Grossman (1998)
for dictator game play; Mason et al (1991) for duopolistic play; Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Eckel and
Grossman (1996) and Nowell and Tinkler (1993) for public good contributions; Fershtman and Gneezy (1998)
and Croson and Buchan (1999) for trust games; Powel and Ansic (1998) and Schubert et al. (1999) for risk15
among the American subjects; the American male subjects do not exhibit any notable average
gender sensitivity at the same time as there is a substantial and significant gender sensitivity
in the female group.
15
&XOWXUDO'LIIHUHQFHVDQG&RQVLVWHQF\
Cultural differences in economic experimental behavior have been reported by Roth et al.
(1991) in ultimatum game behavior. In Table 1 we note that in all subject groups the average
frequencies of hawkish play are higher for the Swedish subjects compared to the American
subjects. If we test for homogeneity concerning the strategy choices for the two subject
groups homogeneity can be rejected at  018 . 0 = S .
It should also be mentioned that Roth et al (1991) detected that although cultural
differences existed, the ultimatum game behavior within a cultural group was “consistent” in
that cultural groups with high average offers also had low average rejection thresholds. This is
observation is not directly supported by our data. One way of looking at the consistency
within the different cultures is to look at the expected coordination rate within each culture,
which will be given by :  ( ) ( ) ML LM ML LM ML LM S S S S - + - = 1 1 , h . Without any signals to coordinate on
the maximal coordination rate will be 0.5, which occurs when  5 . 0 = LL S .
16 The coordination
rate is given by  51 . 0 , » )0 0) h  for the American mixed subject group and it is  55 . 0 , » )0 0) h
for the Swedish group. However, if we hypothetically let the American female group meet the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
attitudes. Furthermore, a number of studies in sociology, psychology and political science have demonstrated
gender effects in non-economic behavior. See Eckel and Grossman (1998) for a brief review.
15 Homogeneity between the American female groups that received different gender labels can be rejected at a
statistical significant level ( 017 . 0 = S ).
16 Hence, values above 0.5 indicate that the subjects succeed in using signal as a coordination device.16
Swedish male group the coordination rate would increase to 0.61. These observations do not
support the hypothesis about cultural consistent experimental behavior.
7ZR$GGLWLRQDO%6H[SHULPHQWV
We shall now report the observations from two additional Swedish subject groups that
received the BS treatment. The first subject group participated in an experiment (that is
described in Holm (1998)) that was designed to test for gender effects similar to the ones
described earlier. The second subject group was a control group that participated in an
ethnical discrimination experiment (reported in Holm, 2000). In these experiments the payoff
structure was changed and the gender signal consisted of a male or female name of the co-
player.
17 In the first experiment 161 subjects were recruited from the same category of
students as in the experiments discussed before. The subjects in the second experiment were
fewer and younger; 112 subjects were recruited from three different secondary high schools in












Female subjects: 19.6 1.9
Males subjects: 21.8 14.1
Table 5: Absolute differences (in units of percentages) in the play against females and
males.
On average the subjects exhibited again an overall increased hawkishness
against female co-players. In the first group there is a symmetric and strong impact of the
gender signal in both the male and female groups. In the second group the effect is smaller in
both groups. In the second group of females, the impact of the gender signal is weak and the
effect is reversed, which means that the subjects played slightly more hawkish against males.
&RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV
In all we have four observations on experimental behavior in BS games. In all four
experiments the subjects played on average more hawkish against female co-players. In three
of these the impact of the gender signal was statistically significant. Hence, our data motivates
us to conclude that the controlled gender signal has impact on experimental behavior.
However, care should be taken when generalizing; some observations indicate that cultural
factors and age factors in the subject pool may matter.
We also detected substantial gender differences in gender sensitivity in the
American subject group; American female subjects played significantly more hawkish against
females than against males at the same time as the gender signal did not notably affect the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 The proportion in earnings between a hawk and a dove in a pure equilibrium was altered from 2:3 (i.e., 40:60)18
males behavior. If we look at the average gender sensitivity in all four experiments then the
average gender sensitivity was 20.0 in the female groups and 13.6 in the male groups.
18
However, if we exclude the American experiment there is virtually no gender difference in the
remaining samples.
19 While this indicate that cultural factors may be important with regard to
gender differences in gender sensitivity, it is relatively safe to say that the experimental results
indicate that the female subjects’ tendency to play more hawkish against females than against
males is hardly smaller than the corresponding male tendency.
'LVFULPLQDWLRQLQ%DUJDLQLQJ
Due to the coordination aspect in the BS game playing more hawkish against a certain group
does not necessarily mean treating the group unfavorably. Thus, it can be argued that playing
more hawkish against females than against males is not discrimination but a use of
stereotypes to coordinate. In one technical sense the subjects discriminates between gender
signals, but it is not discrimination in the sense that they necessarily treats one group
unfavorably. To make more general conclusions regarding experimental evidence of sex
discrimination in bargaining we will now consider a class of strategic situations where it is
less problematic to determine what it means to treat a group unfavorable.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to 1:2.
18 In these averages each experiment are given the same weight. If we base the weight on the sizes of the subject
groups female gender sensitivity would increase somewhat while the male gender sensitivity would be about the
same.
19 In the three Swedish subject groups the average male gender sensitivity is 17.4 and the average female gender
sensitivity is 17.6.19
$0HDVXUHRI'LVFULPLQDWLRQ
Let player L and co-player M either sequentially or simultaneously choose actions from their
action sets and denote the players actions and action sets by  L L $ D Î  and  M M $ D Î . Consider a
set of bargaining situations that satisfy the following condition: for all  L L $ D Î , the utility
function  ( ) M L L D D X ,  is ZHDNO\PRQRWRQLF in  M D . In these bargaining situations player L can be
said to be XQDPELJXRXVO\DIIHFWHG by M s choice.
 20 To see this, note that a decrease in the
value of  M D  can only make L worse off or indifferent and an increase in  M D  can only make L
better off or indifferent. We will use this general property to define what it means to act
XQIDYRUDEO\ against a group in strategic situations. Suppose that a group of individuals
playing the M role play against two different groups denoted by a  and b  that both play the L
role.
'HILQLWLRQ: 8QIDYRUDEOH WUHDWPHQW: Consider the class of bargaining situations where L is
unambiguously affected by M. Denote by 
a
M D  and 
b
M D  the average action choice of the M group
when playing against the a  and b  groups respectively. We then say that a group  b  is
treated unfavorable compared to the a  group if 
b a
M M D D > .
([DPSOHV
i) %LQDU\FKRLFH: Suppose the group of M players are respondents in an ultimatum game and
that the a  and b  groups make the ultimatum proposals. In this case each M player makes a
binary choice  {} 1 , 0 = M $  between accepting the offer ( 1 = M D ) and rejecting it ( 0 = M D ).
Suppose that for a given value of the offer (i.e.,  L D ) 50 percent of the M players accept the offer20
when playing against group a  players but only 20 percent accept the same offer when it
comes from members of the b  group. Clearly, group b  is unfavorably treated and we have
that  2 . 0 5 . 0 = > =
b a
M M D D .
ii) &KRRVLQJDQXPEHULQDQLQWHUYDO: Suppose the group of M players make the ultimatum
proposals and that the a  and b  groups are the respondents. If the M players on average offer
45 when playing against the a  players but only 35 when playing against the b  group, then
group b  is treated unfavorably since  35 . 0 45 . 0 = > =
b a
M M D D .
We will now introduce a simple measure that captures both the direction and the magnitude of
unfavorable treatment.
'HILQLWLRQ 7KHGLVFULPLQDWLRQHIIHFW Denote the maximum number that the M players can
choose by  M D . We define the discrimination effect in group M against group b  as:









Firstly, note that (1) can be applied both to binary cases (where  {} 1 , 0 = M $ ) and to cases where
subjects choose a number in an interval (where  [ ] M M D $ , 0 = ). Secondly, from the definition it
should be clear that 
b
M D  indicates the percentage change in average behavior due to the signal
about group category (i.e., a  or b ).
21 Thirdly, since,  M D  is non-negative it follows that
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 In fact, we shall study situations that satisfy a more strict criterion of unambigouity; for all  L L $ D Î , the utility
function  ( ) M L L D D X ,  is QRQGHFUHDVLQJ in  M D  and VWULFWO\LQFUHDVLQJ in  M D  for some  L L $ D Î .
21 However, depending on whether  M D  is a binary or a number in an interval the interpretation of  b
M D  differs
somewhat. In example i) above  30 = D
b
M  should be interpreted as the units of percentage decrease in the average21
100 100 £ D £ -
b
M . A positive discrimination effect (i.e.,  0 > D
b
M ) means that the b  group is
unfavorable treated by group M and a negative indicates that the b  group is favorably treated.
Finally, without any systematic discrimination the mathematical expectation of 
b
M D  should be
zero.
7KHGLVFULPLQDWLRQHIIHFWLQDVHULHVRIH[SHULPHQWV
Recently, a number of experiments have been conducted from which it is possible to extract
data on the discrimination effect in strategic situations where a certain group is
unambiguously affected by another group as described above. Whereas Solnick (1998) focus
only on the gender issue, the other studies focus on gender in connection to some other
controlled experimental variable like physical attractiveness (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999),
the effect of smiling (Scharleman et al., 1999), and ethnicity (Fershtman and Gneezy, 1998;
and Holm, 2000). All these experimental studies concern two player bargaining situations and
possess the following properties that are important when studying the sex discrimination
effect:
i) The subjects are made aware of the sex of their co-players, but are not
explicitly informed that the sex of their co-players is a critical experimental variable. These
aspects are important to allow the experimental behavior be contingent on gender and to
obtain natural behavior.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
M population’s choice of the favorable action when meeting a b  player compared to the choice towards an a
player. In example ii) the discrimination effect (i.e.,  10 = D
b
M ) should be interpreted as the units of percentage
decrease in the number (e.g., the dollar amounts) chosen by the average M population when meeting a  b  player
compared to the number chosen when meeting an a  player.22
ii) The sex of the co-player is given as a controlled signal. The signals used
include written names (Solnick (1998), Fershtman and Gneezy (1998), Holm (2000)),
photographs of co-players (i.e., Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) and Scharleman et al (1999)).
Consequently, we do not include studies of face to face interaction. The reason for doing this
is not that face to face situations are uninteresting, but that it is much more difficult to isolate
the pure gender effect in such situations (where a number of physical, psychological and
social attributes are revealed to the bargaining parties).
22 However, it should be stressed that
the more controlled situations we consider here can yield different results from face to face
experiments.
23
iii) The subjects have real monetary incentives in the experiments. In
experimental economics real monetary incentives have since long ago been recognized as a
necessary ingredient for making the experimental results convincing (see e.g., Mosteller and
Nogee, 1951 and Kagel and Roth, 1995).
24
Let us now study the discrimination effect for various strategic situations. In each situation the
behaviors of both men and women against male or female co-players are studied. We let
female subjects take the role as the b  group and let the males be the a  group. The






M D D D , where
{} ) 0 M , Î  and 0 denotes males and ) denotes females. A positive sign of the discrimination
effect indicates unfavorable treatment of females and a negative sign the opposite.
                                                          
22 If these factors cannot be controlled for, it can be argued that face to face situations should be considered as
uncontrolled. For a discussion of face to face experiments, see e.g., chapter 4 in Kagel and Roth (1995).
23 For instance, Eckel and Grossman (1998) report male ”chivalrous” behavior towards females in a face to face
ultimatum response situation.
24 However, it should be mentioned that non-economic studies of experimental bargaining behavior do not
always include monetary payoffs (see e.g. King and Hinson (1994)).23
8OWLPDWXPJDPHV
In the most common form of the ultimatum game a proposer initially receives a sum of money
of the experimenter.
￿￿￿ The proposer may then send a share of this sum to a responder who
may accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the proposer and the responder receive
money according to the proposal. If it is rejected then neither the proposer nor the responder
receives any money. It is not difficult to imagine bargaining processes in reality, where parties
end up in ultimatum like situations. For instance, an employer may make a wage offer to a job
applicant and the latter can accept or reject it. As indicated in the examples above, it is
possible to study the discrimination effects in both proposer and responder behavior.
8OWLPDWXP SURSRVDOV: Observations from Ultimatum experiments are available in Solnick
(1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), and Holm (2000). In Solnick and Schweitzer (1999)
two observations are obtained for each gender signal depending on whether the photograph
represents a physical attractive or unattractive subject. The discrimination effects for the
subject groups are presented in Table 6 and the calculations to obtain them are given in
Appendix 2. As we can see from the results there is a positive discrimination effect against
women in all eight groups. However, the discrimination effects are relatively small.
                                                          




) D  Males 
)
0 D
Solnick (1998) 8.2  (29) 3.0  (36)
Solnick and Schweitzer (1999)
unattractive 1.0 (43) 2.8 (35)
attractive 2.7 (43) 3.1 (35)
Holm (2000) 11.9* (17) 1.1* (16)
Table 6. Discrimination effects in ultimatum proposals. Parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each
group. The starred (*) figures are included to get the presentation as complete as possible, but have weaknesses
for the variables that are studied.
26
8OWLPDWXPUHVSRQVHV: Again we have observations from three different experiments. Two of
these (Solnick (1998) and Solnick and Schweitzer (1999)) apply the strategy method in the
ultimatum game which means that the data is based on the responders’ minimum acceptable
offers. In order to get the variables consistent with our general framework 
L
M D  is defined as the
average maximum amount that the respondent (of group M) allows the proposer (of group L) to
keep for himself. Holm (2000) applies the game method where each responder receives one
offer out of two amounts (a low or a high offer)
27. This means that each subject makes a
binary choice (accept or reject) and that 
L
M D  is the average acceptance rate in group M against
group L. Again, we see the same pattern as before in all but one male group where the
discrimination effect is positive. Furthermore, note that the average magnitude of the
discrimination effect is higher in the responder behavior than in the proposer behavior above.
                                                          
26 The figures from Holm (2000) refer to the behavior of a small group of subjects that chose to play a two
person ultimatum game when they also had the option of playing a three person ultimatum game. Hence, besides
that the groups are small, there might be a selection effect in this data.25
Females 
)
) D Males 
)
0 D
Solnick (1998) 13.3  (27) 9.4  (38)
Solnick and Schweitzer(1999)
unattractive 0.1  (10) 1.4  (20)
attractive 1.5  (10) 4.0  (20)
Holm (2000)
low offer 34.8  (30) 20.6  (35)
high offer 21.0 (27) -18.5  (18)
Table 7. Discrimination effects in ultimatum responses. Parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each
group.
7UXVWDQGUHFLSURFLW\JDPHV
In this class of games a sum is initially given to player A who can choose whether to send an
amount to another player B.
28 The amount sent to B is multiplied by a factor and B can then
decide whether to return some money to A. It can be held that A’s decision captures what we
normally would call “trust” and that B’s behavior captures reciprocity.
 29
It is commonly accepted that trust is important in many bargaining situations.
One obvious reason is that it reduces the need for costly tools for control and monitoring.
Reciprocity has also been recognized by Fehr, Gachter and Kirschsteiger (1997) as a
potentially important contract enforcement device in bargaining.
7UXVW: Data from three different experiments are available for studies of discrimination effects
in trust situations. Fershtman and Gneezy (1998) and Holm (2000) use a design that is similar
                                                                                                                                                                                    
27 To be more exact, each respondent was either confronted with a given proposal of SEK 50 or SEK 100, when
the proposer had been given SEK 280.
28 For a more elaborate presentation of this type of game, see Berg, Dickhaut and McGabe (1995).26
to the one used by Berg, Dickhaut and McGabe (1995). The average amount sent to the B
players (belonging to group L) is given by 
L
M D . Both Fershtman and Gneezy (1998), and Holm
(2000) focus on ethnic discrimination. The combined ethnicity and gender signal is given by
Western and Eastern Jewish names in Fershtman and Gneezy (1998), which means that we
get two observations of the discrimination effect in this study. Also Holm (2000) studies the
effects of ethnicity. The gender signal is given by Swedish and Non-Swedish names.
30
However, since we here focus on the gender aspect we will only consider the group that
received Swedish names.
31
Scharlemann et al. (1999) use a variant of the trust game where the subjects
make an initial binary choice of whether or not to trust a co-player. In this case 
L
M D  is the
average trusting rate in the M group against the L group. Each subject can see a photograph of
their co-player that is either smiling or has a neutral facial expression. This means that for
each gender we get data on discrimination effects both for the group that got a smiling male or
female co-player and the group that played against a co-player with a neutral facial
expression.
In all we obtain discrimination effects for 10 different groups. In three of these
the discrimination effect is negative. All negative discrimination effects are observed in male
groups, which means that there is a consistent positive discrimination effect in all female
groups. Hence, whereas females tend to treat other females unfavorable in trusting situations,
the results are inconclusive for the male groups.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
29 It should be noted that each decision also may involve aspects of altruism and that trust can be linked to the
more general concept of social capital (see Glaeser et al. (1999)).
30 The Non-Swedish names where obtained among a group of refugee immigrants (e.g., names from Bosnia,
Iran, Turkey, Somalia.)




) D ) Males (
)
0 D )
Fershtman and Gneezy (1998)
Western names  6.2  (106) 31.8  (134)
Eastern names  2.8  (111) -24.0  (132)
Holm (2000)  1.8  (60)  5.3  (59)
Sharlemann (1999)
Smiling face 19.6 (*) -26.1  (*)
Neutral face 29.7  (*) -10.2  (*)
Table 8. Discrimination effects in trust decisions. Parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each group.
Stars (*) indicate that the number of subjects in each subgroup is not reported.
32
5HFLSURFLW\: There is only available results from one experiment where it is possible to study
how the responders in a trust game are influenced by information about the co-player’s sex.
33
In Holm (2000) the groups of subjects got two different treatments; one group was informed
that their co-player had sent them a relatively large sum and the other group was told that their
co-players had sent them a relatively small sum. The results in Table 9 demonstrate negative
discrimination effects in all but one female group. Hence, these observations deviate from the
previous pattern of mainly positive discrimination effects. This may indicate that different
mechanisms are dominant in this particular bargaining situation, but we cannot exclude that
these negative effects is due to random variations in the data. The number of observations in
this situation is too small to warrant any conclusions regarding discrimination effects in
reciprocity behavior.
                                                          
32 The total number of subjects in Sharlemann et al (1999) is 120.28
Females (
)




small sum - 6.5 (38) -9.9  (39)
large sum 11.4  (23) -0.4  (19)
Table 9. Discrimination effects in female and male groups. Parentheses indicate the number of subjects in each
group.
&RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV
In the presentation above we use reported observations from 16 female and 16 male subject
groups. To study discrimination behavior in all groups a general measure of discrimination
effects is developed. Each group has been subject to different treatments that allow for
calculations of sex discrimination effects in bargaining situations, where one party is
unambiguously affected by the other party’s action. If gender signals did not matter to the
subjects it is reasonable to expect that the probability of a positive discrimination effect is
equal to the probability of a negative one.
34 There is a significant indication on discrimination
against females; the discrimination effect was positive in 25 out of 32 subject groups. If we
regard these observations as independent and apply the binomial distribution we can strongly
reject that there is no discrimination ( 00078 . 0 = S ). Furthermore, there are notable gender
differences in discrimination behavior. In the female groups 15 discrimination effects are
positive and one is negative, which means we can strongly reject that there is no
                                                                                                                                                                                    
33 Fershtman and Gneezy (1998) only report responder behavior for a male subgroup and Scharleman et al.
(1999) did not use actual co-players.
34 To make this assertion we must add some assumption about the shapes of the distributions of the
discrimination effects. Since, the measure of discrimination effect is developed in this paper and hence used for
the first time there is too little data to make qualified guesses about its distribution. To avoid technicalities we
make the (sufficient) assumption that the distributions are symmetrical.29
discrimination effect in the female groups ( 00024 . 0 = S ). Noting that there are 10 negative
and 6 positive discrimination effects among the male groups there is not a corresponding
consistent and significant unfavorable treatment against women among the male groups
( 12 . 0 = S ). Thus, in these experiments we can conclude that females consistently act more
unfavorably against other females than against males and that this is not necessarily the case
for males. This is also revealed by the average discrimination effect; it was 10 in the female
groups and -0.4 in the male groups.
The discrimination effects in absolute terms (
)
M D ) are in general higher when
the action is a binary choice compared to when the choice variable is a number within an
interval. The average absolute discrimination effect in the case of binary choices for all
groups is 17.4 whereas the average discrimination effect when the choices are numbers in an
interval is 6.8. One conceivable reason for this is that, unlike in binary choices, certain
numbers in a given interval may appear to the subjects as the “natural” choice (like, for
instance, proposing 50 percent of the initial sum in an ultimatum game or in a trust game).
The presence of such behavioral regularities is likely to reduce the variation in the choices and
possibly overshadow the gender signal to a certain degree.
([SODQDWLRQV
One obvious way to interpret the fact that gender signals significantly affect experimental
behavior in BS games is that the co-players gender are (more or less) consciously used as a
coordination device according to the theories outlined by Schelling (1960).
35 However, this
does not explain why females and not males get the smaller portion and it certainly does not
                                                          
35 See Holm (1998).30
explain why females have a higher sensitivity for gender signals than males. Furthermore, it
does not explain why females are more inclined to discriminate against females than males.
We will not be able to develop a consistent theory that fully explains all aspects
of this behavior. However, we will point at a number of conceivable explanations to some of
our observations. In doing this we combine rational choice theory with results from recent
findings in social psychology.
It is not obvious how to explain these experimental phenomena with standard
economic discrimination theory. Of course, it is possible to twist Becker’s (1957) preference
argument and claim that the experimental behavior simply reveals that both men and women
have preferences for giving males the larger part and that females have stronger gender
preferences than males. However, this is just to rephrase the results in a different terminology
and such an "explanation" does neither make justice to the experimental results nor to
Becker’s discrimination theory.
A conceivable explanation to the fact that subjects on average are more likely to
distribute the larger amount to the males in the experiment is that they consciously or
unconsciously make use of stereotypes. Using stereotypes means according to Eagly (1995)
that females are considered more socially sensitive, friendly, concerned with others’ welfare,
whereas males are considered dominant, independent and aggressive. Now, if the subjects
associate general gender stereotypes to the probability that the co-player chooses the hawkish
strategy in a BS game or that he does not accept an ultimatum proposal, the stereotypes
obviously point in the direction that females are less likely to play such a hawkish strategy.
36
The expected payoff from playing hawkish against a co-player playing according to the
                                                          
36 Technically this hypothesis is an example of statistical discrimination (see Arrow, 1972 and Phelps, 1972).
However, in this case the unobservable characteristics (that are equivalent to e.g., "productivity" in labor market
discrimination models) are general mentality attributes in bargaining.31
female stereotype is higher than it is against the male stereotype, which explains the average
tendency to let males have the larger share.
37 
38
Why are modern young bright students using stereotypes? In the BS game it
clearly helps the students to coordinate and improve their payoff and this is so independent of
if the stereotypes accurately describe real behavioral gender differences or not. Thus, this
reference to stereotypes is satisfactory from a game theoretical point of view. However, our
results could be considered more economically relevant if the presence of stereotypes can be
given a rational explanation. In that case the use of stereotypes reflects something more than
an effect that crops up in experiments. Part of such an explanation can be found in recent
meta-analytical studies in psychology. In this type of studies, established quantitative
measures are used to summarize results from various research areas. Several such studies
have concluded that peoples’ gender stereotypes in general are supported by empirical
observations.
39 Thus, for instance, people tend to believe that males are more aggressive than
females and this is, in fact true according to several studies.
40 We then get an explanation for
the use of stereotypes if we combine these findings with standard economic theory that simply
says that people make use of information that improve their payoffs. According to this
explanation, not only are our subjects using a stereotype to improve their outcomes in the
experiment. The stereotypes are likely to have a value for them also in making better
predictions in the world around them.
The reasoning above both explains the direction of and the presence of
discrimination behavior. But, why are women more sensitive to gender signals than men? One
relatively straightforward economic explanation is that women have incentives to be more
                                                          
37 It should be noted stereotypes about risk attitudes lead in the same direction; if e.g., males are more willing to
take risks they are considered to be more likely to play the hawkish strategy in a BS game.
38 Note, that whereas it is relatively easy to associate gender stereotypes to strategies in the BS game and the
Ultimatum game, it is more problematic in the case of trust games. However, it is possible that since males are
considered less socially sensitive a player may believe that he has to send more money to a male co-player than
to a female co-player to trigger reciprocal actions.
39 See e.g., Eagly (1995) for references.32
observant to their rights in potential sex discrimination situations. The reason for this is that
affirmative action policies and laws in general are designed to support the discriminated party,
which is more likely to be a woman than a man. Thus, the expected value of being informed
and sensitive to gender is higher for women. We know of no study that has investigated this
question empirically. However, in the spirit of our hypothesis Browne (1997) observes that
American female business students on average have stronger beliefs than males that pure
discrimination and male opposition to women (in management) explain lower participation of
women in upper management.
41
Let us finally show that it is possible to construct other explanations to the
higher female gender sensitivity. A more far-fetched hypothesis inspired by evolutionary
theory and/or learning theory is that the behavior reflects a more general reminiscence of
behavioral situations, where it has been more important for females to take into account the
gender of the other party than for a male. In bargaining situations there is always a potential
conflict lurking, that eventually may lead to physical violence. Now, due to average relative
physical weakness and to higher male aggressiveness a female’s expected gain from a conflict
with a man would on average be smaller than the male’s expected gains. As a consequence,
the optimal female behavioral strategy may be to never challenge men, but only women.
However, for a substantial part of the males it is possible that the optimal strategy may be to
always go for the largest part independent of the other party’s sex. Now, if some subjects
bring with them reminiscences of strategies like these into the experimental situation, the sex
of the opponent will be important to these females but not to the corresponding males. This
will affect the population’s average gender signal sensitivity.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40 See e.g., Bettencourt and Miller (1996).
41 Clearly, believing in the presence of sex discrimination is not the same as sensitivity to gender signals.
However, the results are consistent with our results and the hypothesis above in that someone with stronger prior
beliefs in discrimination also has a stronger reason to be observant to gender signals.33
&RQFOXVLRQDQG,PSOLFDWLRQV
The purpose of this paper is to study and analyze experimental sex discrimination. It is argued
that economic experiments can be one important complementary way to understand and
isolate discrimination behavior in economic transactions. The results from two similar BS
experiments conducted in Sweden and USA reveal a cultural difference between the Swedish
and the American group in that the average play of the hawkish strategy is higher among the
Swedish subjects than among the Americans. Furthermore, this effect can mainly be attributed
to differences in the female groups.
In general, subjects played more hawkish against female co-players than against
male co-players. The impact of gender signals (about the subjects’ co-players) on the observed
behavior was higher among females than males. However, whereas the gender sensitivity in
the Swedish subject groups were relatively balanced between the sexes, almost all gender
sensitivity in the US subject group can be attributed to the females. In fact, whereas there is
practically no evidence that American males play more hawkish against females than against
males, it is significant that females do it.
To learn more about experimental discrimination behavior in general and to
investigate if the effects in the BS experiment were specific for just that type of game, we also
present results for a class of bargaining situations where it is possible to define what it means
to treat one group unfavorably. We provide a measure of the direction and the strength of
discrimination behavior. Thirty-two subject groups were identified as having received
adequate experimental treatments that allow for calculations of sex discrimination effects in
bargaining situations. Viewed as isolated experiments, the discrimination effects in each
subject group may often seem relatively small and unimportant. However, when the effect is34
studied consistently across all experiments a systematic pattern emerges. There is a significant
indication on discrimination against females; in 25 out of 32 subject groups females were on
average treated unfavorably compared to males. Gender differences in discrimination
behavior reminding of the observations in the BS experiments were also detected. Over 90
percent of the female groups played on average more favorably towards males than towards
females. The corresponding figure for the male groups was less than 70 percent.
By combining Schelling’s (1960) theories about focal points, with recent
findings in psychology stating that people in general are accurate in their gender stereotypes it
is possible to give a rational explanation to some of our experimental observations. To explain
that females are more sensitive to gender signals we offer two economic explanations based
on the conjecture that females have a higher expected value of being sensitive to gender
signals.
We have stressed that experimental results should be interpreted with care. The
BS experiment is designed to be sensitive to gender signals and the field as such is relatively
new. This makes extrapolations of the results even more hazardous. For instance, in relatively
unexplored fields, one cannot exclude that there are hidden variables in the experiments that
are related to gender and gender signals in a way that is not yet understood. However, the fact
that the co-player’s gender matter in experimental behavior may reflect important behavioral
aspects of real discrimination in economic transactions and it would be a sin of omission not
to mention them. Furthermore, even if it is quite possible that these experimental findings say
little about real behavior they inspire the formulation of new questions and hypotheses that
may be important. The experimental data presented in this paper clearly challenges the cliché
that the causes to economic sex discrimination are to be found in male chauvinism. Rather the
data demonstrates that differences in earnings depend primarily on an unwarranted female
carefulness or paranoia when encountering male co-players. For instance, the substantial35
earnings gap that was reflected in American males having 28 percent higher average
experimental earnings than American females in a BS experiment can almost entirely be
attributed the female tendency to play “dovish” against male co-players.
These findings have potential policy implications. They stress that economic
discrimination may involve a mentality factor and that policies aiming at abolishing
discrimination also must target the female syndrome of unjustified defensiveness towards men
especially in bargaining situations. In the light of these experiments it may even be that some
policies promote rather than work against gender based earnings gaps and sex
discrimination.
42
If we allow for bounded rationality the public exposure of debating and
implementing anti-discrimination policies may even escalate the "mentality effects". If e.g.,
media exaggerates certain "sex discrimination cases" this may reinforce stereotypes and
discrimination expectations so that the stereotypes loose proportions. This in turn may
increase females' awareness and priors of being discriminated, which may reduce their
subjective expected payoff and thus their willingness of challenging men for higher positions
or to take higher education in professions traditionally dominated by males. As a
consequence, the gender gap may not decrease, even if strict anti-discrimination policies are
implemented. The process described above works as a paralyzing self-fulfilling prophecy for
women and confirms their discrimination beliefs. Clearly, this process can go on without any
male discrimination behavior.
                                                          
42 To give a concrete example, in Sweden various affirmative action policies and voluntary programs have been
implemented to promote women to higher positions in the scientific community and as executives in industry
and trade. Clearly, if we extrapolate the experimental results it is questionable if it is advantageous for a female
subordinate to have a manager of the same sex in bargaining situations, since on average the female manager
might be "weaker" against men than against women. Needless, to say this reasoning does not extend to problems
such as the dynamic effects of affirmative action policies that has been analyzed by e.g., Coate and Loury (1993)
and experimentally by Corns and Schotter (1996).36
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$33(1',;
This appendix contains the information given to the American subjects and the text on the
questionnaire. The information and the questionnaire in the Swedish experiment were similar
in almost every detail and are available in Holm (1998).

,QIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH([SHULPHQW
You have been paired with a co-player. If you and your co-player are able to coordinate your
choices, then you will earn points in the experiment. The payoff (in terms of points) depends
partly on your choices and partly on your co-player’s choices. However, your co-player’s
choices will be unknown to you and he/she will not know your choices.
Your answers will give you points that will be counted in dollars. You can earn up to $161
(and no less than $ 0) depending on how well you succeed. A number of winners will be
randomly selected among those who answer the questions. The winners will get the value that
he/she has earned in the experiment. The probability of being selected as a winner is 3%,
which means that on average about one participant out of thirty will be selected. Hence, your
task is to collect as many points as possible by choosing strategically and by guessing your
co-player’s choices.
,QVWUXFWLRQV.
1. Please, fill in your own name and postal address at the top of the Questionnaire (next page)!
(Your answers’ will be anonymous and will only be used for the purpose of research. Your
name and address are needed to make it possible to identify and pay the winners.)
2. Please check that your co-player is classified into a category!
3. Please fill in the questionnaire and when you have finished, please hand in the




Your Name:___________________ Co-player category:
Postal Address:_____________________ Male Student
_________________________________
_________________________________
,QVWUXFWLRQ: You will confront four strategic situations, where your payoff depends partly on
your own choices and partly on your co-player’s choices. Your task is to earn as many points
(in dollars) as possible.
 You are going to choose between Right and Left.
3RLQWV If you choose the same direction as your co-player, then you will earn $30 each. (That
is if you both choose Right or if you both choose Left). If you and your co-player choose
different directions, nobody will earn anything.
Circle RQH alternative!
$OWHUQDWLYHV Left Right
 You are going to choose between Right and Left.
3RLQWV Again, you have to choose the same direction as your co-player in order to gain
anything. You will earn $30 each if both of you choose Right. If both choose Left, then you




  You are going to choose a distribution.
3RLQWV You and your co-player have the opportunity of sharing $100. In order to get the
money you and your co-player have to agree on how to share the money. If both choose the
same distribution, you will get your share of the chosen distribution and your co-player will
get his/her share. If your choices lead to disagreement about how to share the money, both
receive zero dollars. (See the examples below).
Circle RQH alternative below!
$OWHUQDWLYHV
You get $60 and your co-player gets $40.
You get $50 and your co-player gets $50.
You get $40 and your co-player gets $60.
([SODQDWLRQDQG([DPSOHV Notice that when you have chosen one alternative there is only
one alternative that your co-player can choose if you agree about how to share the money.
Example:
i) If you have chosen the uppermost alternative, agreement requires that your co-player has
chosen the lowermost alternative. (In this case, you will get $60 and your co-player will get
$40.)
ii) If you have chosen the middle alternative, agreement requires that your co-player also has
chosen the middle alternative. (In this case, both will get $50.)
iii) If you have chosen the lowermost alternative, agreement requires that your co-player has
chosen the uppermost alternative. (In this case, you will get $40 and your co-player will get
$60.)
  You are going to choose a distribution.
3RLQWV You and your co-player have the possibility of sharing $100. The problem is the same
as in question 3, but here you and your co-player have fewer ways to share the money.
Circle RQH alternative below!
$OWHUQDWLYHV
You get $60 and your co-player gets $40.
You get $40 and your co-player gets $60.46
$SSHQGL[
This appendix contains the data used to calculate the discrimination effects in section 4.
Information of the experimental design etc. can be obtained in respective paper. The papers
are presented in the order they are referred to in the tables.
6ROQLFN: We start with the study conducted by Solnick 1998. In this study the
maximum offer was $10 (i.e.,  10 = M D ) and the average offer from females to other females
(
)
) D ) was 4.31; average female offers to males (
0
) D ) was 5.13; average male offers to females
(
)
0 D ) was 4.43, and average male offers to males (
0
0 D ) was 4.73. Using the measure of the
discrimination effect we get:
2 . 8 100
10





)  and  0 . 3 100
10






Solnick (1998) reports the average minimum acceptable offers for each group. If we take
the difference between the maximum offer (i.e. 10) and the minimum acceptable offer we
get the maximum amount that the responder allows the proposer to allocate to himself. For
the different groups we get  85 . 5 =
)
) D ; 18 . 7 =
0
) D ; 61 . 6 =
)
0 D  and  55 . 7 =
0
0 D . Using the
same method to calculate the discrimination effects as above we get  3 . 13 = D
)
)  and
4 . 9 = D
)
0 .
6ROQLFNDQG6FKZHLW]HU In this paper the relation between gender and physical
attractiveness on a number of photographed subjects is studied. A photograph of a female
or a male subject is either classified by a control group as attractive or unattractive. The47
most attractive and the most unattractive photographs are then selected and presented to a
different subject pool that both play in the proposer and responder role. This means that
two observations are obtained for each gender signal depending on whether the
photograph represents an attractive or unattractive subject.
The maximum amount to propose was $10 and the observations regarding proposer
decision against unattractive female and male subjects are given by the following figures:
60 . 4 =
)
) D ; 70 . 4 =
0
) D ; 44 . 4 =
)
0 D  and  72 . 4 =
0
0 D  which gives  00 . 1 = D
)
)  and  8 . 2 = D
)
0 .
The corresponding figures for attractive female and male subjects were:  60 . 4 =
)
) D ;
07 . 5 =
0
) D ; 48 . 4 =
)
0 D  and  79 . 4 =
0
0 D  which gives  7 . 2 = D
)
)  and  1 . 3 = D
)
0 .
Depending on the attractiveness we also get two different observations for the responder
decisions. The maximum amount that the responder allows an unattractive proposer to
allocate to himself is given by  47 . 6 =
)
) D ; 48 . 6 =
0
) D ; 72 . 6 =
)
0 D  and  86 . 6 =
0
0 D . The
discrimination effects will then be  1 . 0 = D
)
)  and  4 . 1 = D
)
0 . The corresponding figures for
an attractive proposer are  08 . 6 =
)
) D ; 23 . 6 =
0
) D ; 43 . 6 =
)
0 D  and  83 . 6 =
0
0 D . The
discrimination effects will be  5 . 1 = D
)
)  and  0 . 4 = D
)
0 .
+ROP: In Holm (2000) each subject is confronted with a number of one shot
bargaining situations. For each situation the subjects were told that they were matched
with a co-player with a certain name.
43 The observation of proposer behavior in ultimatum
bargaining is based on those subjects that choose to play the ordinary (two-player)
ultimatum game, when they had the opportunity to play a three player ultimatum game.
                                                          
43 Note that the main objective of this study was to investigate ethnical discrimination effects against refugee
immigrants in Sweden. Since these groups are minorities, sufficiently many observations from real matchings
were not possible to obtain (and because of some other more practical reasons) the fictitious co-player names
were used. This element of deception was conducted under considerations of the ethical guidelines of The
Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
.48
Hence, the observations are based on the behavior in a subgame, which means that there
might be a selection effect present.
44 Furthermore, all observation we report here is based
on the subjects that received a Swedish co-player name.
45 In this study the maximum
amount the proposer could offer was SEK 280 (i.e.,  280 = M D ) and the average offers was
125 =
)
) D ; 158 =
0
) D ; 137 =
)
0 D  and  140 =
0
0 D . The discrimination effects will then be
9 . 11 = D
)
)  and  1 . 1 = D
)
0 .
The observation of responder behavior is less problematic. One group received the
information that their co-player had offered them SEK 50 and the other group received the
information that they had been offered SEK 100. The average acceptance rates in the first
group were:  438 . 0 =
)
) D ; 785 . 0 =
0
) D ; 5 . 0 =
)
0 D , and  706 . 0 =
0
0 D  which result in
8 . 34 = D
)
)  and  6 . 20 = D
)
0 . In the group that received the larger sum the acceptance rates
were: 727 . 0 =
)
) D , 938 . 0 =
0
) D ; 8 . 0 =
)
0 D , and  615 . 0 =
0
0 D . The corresponding
discrimination effects were  0 . 21 = D
)
)  and  5 . 18 - = D
)
0 .
In Holm (2000) the subjects also participated in a trust game as described above. Each A
player was asked to allocate SEK 200 between himself and a B player. The amount sent to
B was tripled and B had then an opportunity to return money to A. The average amounts
sent by subjects that played the A role were:  7 . 86 =
)
) D , 2 . 90 =
0
) D ; 6 . 99 =
)
0 D ,
2 . 110 =
0
0 D . We then get  8 . 1 = D
)
)  and  3 . 5 = D
)
0 . Like in the study of responder behavior
in the ultimatum situation the B players received information that the co-player either had
sent them SEK 50 or SEK 100. Those receiving the smaller amount returned on average
the following amounts:  6 . 51 =
)
) D , 8 . 41 =
0
) D ; 2 . 53 =
)
0 D , and  4 . 38 =
0
0 D . Keeping in
                                                          
44 The subjects’ played a game that Riedl and Okada (1999) call a social exclusion and coalition formation game.
45 The reason for this was to make sure that the gender signal was clear to all subjects; for some of the non-
Swedish co-player names one can expect that that the subjects had problems in distinguishing a female from a
male co-player name.49
mind that  150 = M D  we get  5 . 6 - = D
)
)  and  9 . 9 - = D
)
0 . In the case the subjects received
SEK 100, the groups returned the following average amounts:  8 . 77 =
)
) D , 1 . 112 =
0
) D ;
0 . 95 =
)
0 D , and  7 . 93 =
0
0 D . In this case we have that  300 = M D  and consequently that
4 . 11 = D
)
)  and  4 . 0 - = D
)
0 .
)HUVKWPDQDQG*QHH]\): In the trust game of Fershtman and Gneezy (1998) each A
player was asked to allocate NIS 20 between himself and a B player. The amount sent to
B was tripled and B had then the opportunity to return some money to A. The average
amounts sent to B players with Western names were:  3 . 11 =
)
) D , 53 . 12 =
0
) D ;
79 . 10 =
)
0 D , 16 . 17 =
0
0 D . We then get  2 . 6 = D
)
)  and  8 . 31 = D
)
0 . The corresponding
figures for the Eastern B players were  38 . 10 =
)
) D , 94 . 10 =
0
) D ; 43 . 10 =
)
0 D , 62 . 5 =
0
0 D ,
8 . 2 = D
)
)  and  0 . 24 - = D
)
0 .
6FKDUOHPDQQHWDO: In this study the subjects played a binary variant of the trust
game where consequently  1 = M D . All subjects played the A role but were informed that
they played against co-players whose photographic images were shown to the subjects
before the play.
46 The co-player was either smiling or had a neutral facial expression. The
average trust rates against neutral co-players were  286 . 0 =
)
) D , 583 . 0 =
0
) D ; 667 . 0 =
)
0 D ,
and 565 . 0 =
0
0 D . The resulting discrimination effects were  7 . 29 = D
)
)  and  2 . 10 - = D
)
0 .
The corresponding figures for the groups playing against a smiling co-player were
429 . 0 =
)
) D , 625 . 0 =
0
) D ; 00 . 1 =
)
0 D , 739 . 0 =
0
0 D , 6 . 19 = D
)
)  and  1 . 26 - = D
)
0 .
                                                          
46 In reality the subjects played against a pre-programmed computer.